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Abstract— The basic notion of free flight is that aircrews obtain 
the freedom to select their trajectory including the responsibility 
of resolving conflicts with other aircraft. Under low en-route 
traffic loads there is general agreement that free flight can be 
safely applied. Under increasing traffic loads, however, the 
answer to this question becomes unknown. Free flight would 
change ATM in such a fundamental way, that one can speak of a 
paradigm shift and that comes with emerging behavior, i.e. novel 
behavior which is exhibited at the system-wide level and emerges 
from the combined dynamical actions and reactions by individual 
systems and humans that affect the operations. Because emerging 
behavior cannot be predicted from previous experience, we need a 
complementary approach in estimating the safety of free flight 
under relatively high traffic levels. This paper explains how 
recently developed methods in Petri net specification and 
sequential Monte Carlo simulation can be used to make progress 
in addressing this outstanding issue. The paper also presents the 
results of an initial application of these novel methods to a well 
developed autonomous free flight concept of operations. 
 
Index Terms—Sequential Monte Carlo simulation, Petri net 
modelling, Safety risk assessment, Safety-critical systems, 
Autonomous Free flight 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ECHNOLOGY allows aircraft to broadcast information 
about the own-ship position and velocity to surrounding 
aircraft, and to receive similar information from surrounding 
aircraft. This development has stimulated the rethinking of the 
overall concept for today’s Air Traffic Management (ATM), 
e.g. to transfer responsibility for conflict prevention from 
ground to air. As the aircrews thus obtain the freedom to select 
their trajectory, this conceptual idea has been called Free 
Flight [1]. It changes ATM in such a fundamental way, that 
one could speak of a paradigm shift: the centralised control 
becomes a distributed one, responsibilities transfer from 
ground to air, fixed air traffic routes are removed and 
appropriate new technologies are brought in. In free flight, 
each individual aircrew has the responsibility to timely detect 
and solve conflicts, thereby assisted by navigation means, 
surveillance processing and equipment displaying conflict-
solving trajectories. Due to the potentially many aircraft 
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involved, the system is highly distributed. This free flight 
concept definition leaves open many challenges in developing 
adequate procedures, algorithms, equipment performance 
requirements, and has motivated the study of multiple Free 
Flight operational concepts, implementation choices and 
requirements, e.g. [2]-[6]. Crucial in this process is to learn 
understanding how to optimize free flight designs for safety 
and capacity [7].  
The aim of this paper is to study the safety risk assessment 
of en-route free flight operations through modeling and Monte 
Carlo simulation. In [8], such a study has been performed for 
free flight equipped aircraft that are obliged to remain flying 
within a conventional fixed route structure. The current paper, 
however, studies a true free flight concept of operations, i.e. 
one without using fixed route structure. The free flight concept 
we identified for this has been developed for air traffic in the 
Mediterranean area [9]. For short we refer to this operational 
concept as Autonomous Mediterranean Free Flight (AMFF). 
We illustrate an advanced model specification and sequential 
MC simulation approach towards the assessment of collision 
risk of AMFF operation under relatively high traffic density. 
For advanced air traffic operations, [10] gives a nice 
illustration how statistical data in combination with a fault tree 
of the functionalities of the advanced operation can serve to 
predict how reliability of free flight supported systems impact 
contributions to collision risk of an advanced operation [11]. 
Through an example it is shown how this allows improvement 
of the design, such that the reliability-implied contribution to 
collision risk can be lowered to a desired value. 
Also following a fault tree approach, the safety of the 
AMFF concept of operations has been assessed [12], including 
real-time simulations of non-nominal conditions [13]-[15]. The 
results obtained show that application of AMFF seems feasible 
for accommodating low en-route traffic conditions over the 
Mediterranean. In order to assess whether AMFF can safely 
accommodate higher traffic levels, [12] recommends to use a 
more advanced safety risk assessment approach that considers 
complex situations involving dynamic interactions between 
multiple human actors and other systems. 
The recommendation by [12] concurs well with the 
explanation by [16] that the key difficulty of evaluating 
advanced operations is to include emergent behavior, i.e. novel 
behavior which is exhibited at the system-wide level and 
emerges from the combined dynamical actions and reactions 
by individual systems and humans within the system. This 
emergent behavior typically cannot be foreseen and evaluated 
by examining the individuals’ behavior alone. In [16] it is 
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explained that agent based simulation allows to predict the 
impact of revolutionary changes in air transportation; it 
integrates cognitive models of technology behavior and 
description of their operating environment. Simulation of these 
individual models acting together can predict the results of 
completely new transformations in procedures and technology. 
Their MC simulations reach up to the level of novel emerging 
hazardous events. For safety risk assessment however, it is 
required to go further with the MC simulations up to the level 
of emerging catastrophic events. In en-route air traffic these 
catastrophic events are mid-air collisions. The approach 
described in this paper is an example of the latter approach to 
estimate such a difficult metric of collision risk between 
aircraft by the use of advanced approaches in Petri Net 
modeling and Monte Carlo simulation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a 
brief overview of the AMFF concept of operations selected for 
evaluation on collision risk and explains how this operational 
concept has been modeled in a specific Petri net formalism. 
Section III explains the sequential Monte Carlo simulation 
acceleration approach developed for assessing collision risk 
for the AMFF simulation model. Section IV presents results of 
Monte Carlo simulations performed for three AMFF scenarios. 
Section V discusses the results obtained. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PETRI NET MODEL OF AMFF 
For the development of a Petri net model of an advanced 
operation, two key challenges have to be addressed: a 
syntactical challenge of developing a model that is consistent, 
complete and unambiguous, and a semantics challenge of 
developing appropriate human cognition performance models. 
This section explains how the syntactical challenge has been 
addressed. For the mechanism to manage the semantics 
challenge, we have followed the approach studied and 
developed in, e.g. [17]-[21]. The explanation of how this 
cognitive human performance modeling approach has been 
applied to AMFF falls outside the current paper’s scope. 
 
A. AMFF operation 
For a complete description of the AMFF operational 
concept we refer to [9], [14]. In addition, [22] describes the 
background of the AMFF design philosophy. A practical 
implication was to avoid much information exchange between 
aircraft and to avoid dedicated decision-making by artificial 
intelligent machines. Although the conflict detection and 
resolution approach developed for AMFF has its roots in the 
modified potential field approach [4], there are significant 
differences. The main difference is that conflict resolution in 
AMFF is intentionally designed not to take the potential field 
of all aircraft into account. The resulting AMFF design can be 
summarized as follows: 
• All aircraft are supposed to be equipped with 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-
B), which is a system that periodically broadcasts own 
aircraft state information, and continuously receives 
the state information messages broadcasted by aircraft 
that fly within broadcasting range (~ 100 NM). 
• In order to comply to pilot preferences, conflict 
resolution algorithms are designed to solve multiple 
conflicts one by one rather than according to a full 
concurrent way that can be handled by the modified 
potential field approach [4]. 
• Conflict detection and resolution are state-based, that 
is: intent information, such as information at which 
point surrounding aircraft will change course or 
height, is supposed to be unknown. 
• The vertical separation minimum is 1000 ft and the 
horizontal separation minimum is 5 Nm. A conflict is 
detected if these separation minima will be violated 
within 6 minutes. 
• The conflict resolution process consists of two phases. 
During the first phase, one of the aircraft crews should 
make a resolution maneuver. If this does not work, 
then during the second phase, both crews should make 
a resolution maneuver. 
• Prior to the first phase, the crew is warned when an 
ASAS alert is expected to occur if no preventive 
action would be timely implemented; this prediction is 
done by a system referred to as P-ASAS (Predictive 
ASAS). 
• Conflict co-ordination does not take place explicitly, 
i.e. there is no communication on when and how a 
resolution maneuver will be executed. 
• All aircraft are supposed to use the same resolution 
algorithm, and all crew are assumed to use ASAS and 
to collaborate in line with the procedures. 
• Two conflict resolution maneuver options are 
presented: one in vertical and one in horizontal 
direction. The pilot decides which option to execute. 
• ASAS related information is presented to the crew 
through a Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
(CDTI).  
 
B. Stochastically and Dynamically Coloured Petri Net 
The most advanced approaches that have been developed in 
literature to model accident risk of safety-critical operations in 
nuclear and chemical industries make use of the compositional 
specification power of Petri nets to instantiate a model, and 
subsequently use stochastic analysis and Monte Carlo 
simulation (e.g. [23]) to evaluate the model. Since their 
introduction in the 1960s, Petri nets have shown their 
usefulness for many practical applications in different 
industries (e.g. [24]). Various Petri net extensions and 
generalisations, new analysis techniques, and numerous 
supporting computer tools have been developed, which further 
increased their modelling opportunities, though falling short 
for air traffic operations. In order to capture the characteristics 
of air traffic operations through a Petri net, [25]-[27] 
introduced Dynamically Coloured Petri Net (DCPN) and 
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Stochastically and Dynamically Coloured Petri Net (SDCPN), 
and proved that there exists a one-to-one relation with the 
larger class of stochastic processes and analysis techniques 
needed for air traffic operations [28].  
A Coloured PN is a Petri net with a colour attached to each 
token. Such a colour assumes values from a given set, and this 
value does not change as long as the token stays in its place.  
When a token is “transfered” from one place to another place, 
then the colour moves with the token to the next place and may 
also be updated. In a DCPN a colour value may evolve as the 
solution of an ordinary differential equation (ODE). In a 
SDCPN a colour value may evolve as the solution of a 
stochastic differential equation (SDE).  
The specification of an SDCPN for a complex process or 
operation is accomplished in a compositional way [29]. It 
starts with developing relevant Local Petri Nets (LPNs) for 
each agent that exists in the process or operation (e.g. air 
traffic controller, pilot, navigation and surveillance 
equipment). Essential is that these LPNs are allowed to be 
connected with other Petri net parts in such a way that the 
number of tokens residing in an LPN is not influenced by these 
interconnections. We use two types of basic interconnection 
arcs between nodes and arcs in different LPNs: 
• Enabling arc (or inhibitor arc) from one place in one 
LPN to one transition in another LPN. These types of 
arcs have been used widely in Petri net literature. 
• Interaction Petri Net (IPN) from one (or more) 
transition(s) in one LPN to one (or more) transition(s) 
in another LPN.  
In addition, a box is drawn around each LPN, and 
hierarchical interconnection arcs from or to an edge of an LPN 
box are defined to represent several arcs or transitions by only 
one arc or transition.  
 
C. Agents and LPNs to represent AMFF operations 
In the Petri Net modeling of AMFF operations for the 
purpose of an initial collision risk assessment, the following 
agents are taken into account: 
• Aircraft 
• Pilot-Flying (PF) 
• Pilot-Not-Flying (PNF) 
• Airborne Guidance, Navigation and Control  
• Airborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) 
• Communication / Navigation / Surveillance 
It should be noticed that our initial model does not yet 
incorporate Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), 
Airline Operations Centre (AOC), Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
and an environmental model.  
Per agent, particular LPNs and IPNs have been developed 
and subsequently the interactions between these LPNs and 
IPNs have been specified. The listing of agents and LPNs is: 
• Aircraft LPNs: 
o Type 
o Evolution mode 
o Systems mode 
o Emergency mode 
• Pilot-Flying (PF) LPNs: 
o State Situation Awareness 
o Intent Situation Awareness 
o Goal memory 
o Current goal 
o Task performance 
o Cognitive mode 
• Pilot-Not-Flying (PNF) LPNs: 
o Current goal 
o Task performance 
• ASAS LPNs: 
o Processing 
o Alerting 
o Audio alerting  
o Surveillance 
o System mode 
o Priority switch mode 
o Anti-priority switch mode 
o Predictive alerting (of other aircraft) 
• Airborne GNC (Guidance, Navigation, Control) LPNs: 
o Indicators failure mode for PF 
o Engine failure mode for PF 
o Navigation failure indicator for PF 
o ASAS failure indicator for PF 
o ADS-B receiver failure indicator for PF 
o ADS-B transmitter failure indicator for PF 
o Indicator failure mode for PNF 
o Guidance mode 
o Horizontal guidance configuration mode 
o Vertical guidance configuration mode 
o FMS flightplan 
o Airborne GPS receiver 
o Airborne Inertial Reference System (IRS) 
o Altimeter 
o Horizontal position processing 
o Vertical position processing 
o ADS-B transmission 
o ADS-B receiver  
• Communication / Navigation / Surveillance LPNs: 
o Global GPS / satellites 
o Global ADS-B ether frequency 
o SSR Mode-S frequency 
The actual number of LPNs in the whole model then equals 
38N+3, where N is the number of aircraft. In addition the 
number of IPNs equals 35N. 
 
D. Interconnected LPNs of ASAS 
ASAS is modeled through the SDCPN depicted in Figure 1. 
The ADS-B information received from other aircraft is 
processed by the LPN ASAS surveillance. Together with the 
information about its own aircraft state information (from 
AGNC), the LPN ASAS processing uses this information to 
perform conflict detection and resolution functionalities. 
Subsequently, the LPN ASAS alerting  and the LPN P-ASAS 
alerting informs the PF and PNF through ASAS audio alerting 
about any aircraft that is in potential ASAS conflict with the 
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own aircraft, and suggests resolution options including a 
prioritization. Three complementary LPNs represent non-
nominal behavior modes, each combination of which has a 
specific influence on the ASAS alerting LPN: 
• ASAS system mode may be working, failed or corrupted 
(failed or corrupted mode also influences the ASAS 
processing LPN).  
• ASAS priority switching mode; under emergency, the PF 
switches this from “off” to “on”. 
• ASAS anti-priority switch; this is switched from “off” to 
“on” when own ADS-B is not working. 
 
 
Resolution 
mode ASAS
G1
No resolution 
mode ASAS
G5
G4G6 I
4. ASAS audio alerting-i
I I
No audio alert
Audio alert
3. ASAS alerting-i
8. ASAS anti-priority 
switch mode-i
I G
I I
Off
On
Off
On
5. ASAS surveillance-i
ASAS
surveillance info
I
I
7. ASAS priority 
switch mode-i
IG
2. ASAS processing-i
ASAS
processing
I
G
1. P-ASAS alerting-i
P-ASAS
processing
I I
G3G2
6. ASAS System Mode-i
Working
Failure Corrupted
D D D D
Int-Audio-ASAS
Int-ASAS-Res
4 ordinary arcs:
from G1, G2, G3, G6
5 ordinary arcs:
to G1, G2, G3, G4, G5
 
Figure 1. The agent ASAS in AMFF is modelled by eigth LPNs, a number of 
ordinary and enabling arcs and two IPNs (with one place each). 
 
 
E. Interconnected LPNs of Pilot Flying 
This subsection illustrates the specific Petri Net model 
developed for the Pilot Flying. A graphical representation of 
all LPNs the Pilot-Flying consists of, is given in Figure 2. The 
Human-Machine-Interface where sound or visual clues might 
indicate that attention should be paid to a particular issue, is 
represented by an IPN that is not depicted in the Figure. 
Similarly, the arcs to or from any other agent are not shown in 
Figure 2. Because of the very nature of Petri Nets, these arcs 
can easily be added during the follow-up specification cycle. 
To get an understanding of the different LPNs, a good starting 
point might be the LPN “Current Goal” (at the bottom of the 
figure) as it represents the objective the Pilot-Flying is 
currently working on. Examples of such goals are “Collision 
Avoidance”, “Conflict Resolution” and “Horizontal 
Navigation”. For each of these goals, the pilot executes a 
number of tasks in a prescribed or conditional order, 
represented in the LPN “Task Performance”. Examples of such 
tasks are “Monitoring and Decision”, “Execution” and 
“Execution Monitoring”. If all relevant tasks for the current 
goal are considered executed, the pilot chooses another goal, 
thereby using his memory (where goals deserving attention 
might be stored, represented by the LPN “Goal Memory”) and 
the Human-Machine-Interface. His memory where goals 
deserving attention might be stored is represented as the LPN 
“Goal Memory” in Figure 2.  
 
Collision Avoidance (C1)
Navigation Vertical (C4)
Conflic t Resolution (C3)
Preparation Route Change (C6)
Miscellaneous  (C7)
Current G oal PF
Goal M emory PF
Memory
I
I
I
G
sub-
sequent
Task Performance PF
G
sub-
sequent
G
interrupt
Emergency Actions  (C2)
Navigation Horizontal (C5)
I
Int-PF-GM1 Int-PF-GM2
Int-PF-GM4Int-PF-GM3
Int-PF-TP1
Int-PF-TP2
G
G
G
D
G
G
Monitoring 
(T1)
Monitoring 
and Dec is ion 
(T2)
Execution
(T4)
Execution
monitor ing (T5)
Monitoring 
and Goal
Pr ior it isation
(T6)
D
End Task 
(T7)
G
D
D
Coordi-
nation (T3)
Int-PF-GM5
I
Cognitive Mode
GG
State SA
I
Intent SA
I
Int-PF-ISA
I
...
G
interrupt
 
Figure 2. The agent Pilot-Flying in AMFF is modelled by six LPNs, and a 
number of ordinary and enabling arcs, and some IPNs, consisting of one place 
and input and output arcs.  
 
 
 
So, the LPNs “Current Goal”, “Task Performance”, and 
“Goal Memory” are important in the modelling of which task 
the Pilot-Flying is executing. The other three LPNs are 
important in the modelling on how the Pilot-Flying is 
executing the tasks. The LPN “State SA”, where SA stands for 
Situation Awareness, represents the relevant perception of the 
pilot about the states of elements in his environment, e.g. 
whether he is aware of an engine failure. The LPN “Intent SA” 
represents the intent, e.g. whether he intends to leave the Free 
Flight Airspace. The LPN “Cognitive mode” represents 
whether the pilot is in an opportunistic mode, leading to a high 
but error-prone throughput, or in a tactical mode, leading to a 
moderate throughput with a low error probability. 
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F. Model parametrization, verification and validation 
The compositionally specified SDCPN model enables a 
systematic implementation, verification and validation of the 
resulting Monte Carlo simulator. This is done through the 
following systematic steps: 
• Software code testing. This is done through conducting 
the following sequence of testing: random number 
generation, statistical distributions, common functions, 
each LPN implementation, each agent implementation, 
interactions between all agents, full MC simulation;   
• Numerical approximation testing. This is needed to 
identify maximally allowable numerical integration step 
and minimally required number of particular MC 
simulations;    
• Graphical user interface testing. This is to verify that the 
input and output of data works well; 
• Parameterization. This is done through a search for 
literature and statistical sources, and complemented by 
expert interviews. The fusion of these different pieces of 
information is accomplished following a Bayesian 
approach;   
• Initial model validation through studying MC simulator 
behavior and sensitivities to parameter changes under 
dedicated scenarios; 
• Overall validation, which is directed to the evaluation of 
differences between model and reality and what effect 
these differences have at the assessed risk level [30], [31]. 
Statistical data collection and analysis, and active 
participation of operational experts is required.  
The last step should start as early as possible, but should also 
continue throughout the operational concept development 
cycles. Typically, this way of working allows a significant 
improvement of the validation level of the simulation model 
per concept development and safety risk assessment cycle.     
III. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION OF COLLISION RISK 
The basic idea of assessing collision risk is to perform many 
Monte Carlo simulations with the SDCPN model, and while 
doing so, to estimate the collision risk by counting the number 
of collisions and dividing this by the number of simulated 
flight hours. Though this idea is simple, in order to make it 
work in practice, we need an effective way of speeding up the 
Monte Carlo simulation. This section describes the way we are 
doing this by extending the sequential MC simulation 
approach of [32], [33] to collision risk in air traffic. 
 
A. Simulation to first moment of collision 
In [27] it has been shown that an SDCPN model represents 
a stochastic differential equation (SDE) on a hybrid state 
space, driven by Brownian motion and Poisson random 
measure. In [34] it has been shown that under reasonable 
conditions (typically also adopted when specifying an 
SDCPN) the solution of this SDE is a strongly unique 
stochastic hybrid process { , }t tx θ  which has mathematically 
properties that enable powerful stochastic analysis 
(semimartingale and strong Markov). In view of this, [35] has 
extended the approach of [32] to these stochastic hybrid 
processes. This allows us to study the speeding up of the 
AMFF simulation in this general setting, and avoids a need to 
dive into all kind of details of the AMFF model.    
For the N-aircraft traffic scenario the process { , }t tx θ  
consists of components 0 1
  Col{ , , , }Nt t t tx x x x∆ …  and 
0 1
  Col{ , , , }Nt t t tθ θ θ θ∆ … , 
i
tx  assumes values from i
n
ℝ , and 
i
tθ  assumes values from a finite set ( iM ).{ , }i it tx θ , 
1, ,i N= … , is the hybrid state process related to the i-th 
aircraft, and  0 0{ , }t tx θ is the non-aircraft related hybrid state 
process. The total process { , }t tx θ  is n M×ℝ -valued with 
0
N
i
i
n n
=
=∑  and 0
N
ii
M M
=
= ⊗ .  
In order to model collisions between aircraft, we introduce 
mappings from the Euclidean valued process  { }tx  into the 
relative position and velocity between a pair of aircraft ( )ji, . 
The relative horizontal and vertical positions are obtained 
through the mappings ( )ij ty x and ( )ij tz x  respectively. The 
relative horizontal velocity and the vertical rate of 
climb/descent are obtained through the mappings ( )ij tv x  and 
( )ij tr x  respectively. The relations between these position and 
velocity mappings satisfy: 
 
( ) ( )ij ijt tdy x v x dt=  (1) 
( ) ( )ij ijt tdz x r x dt=  (2) 
A collision between aircraft (i,j) means that the process 
{ ( ), ( )}ij ijt ty x z x  hits the boundary of an area where the 
distance between aircraft i and j is smaller than their physical 
size. Under the assumption that the length of an aircraft equals 
the width of an aircraft, and that the volume of an aircraft is 
represented by a cylinder the orientation of which does not 
change in time, then aircraft (i,j) have zero separation if 
ij
tx D∈  with: 
 
{ ; ( ) ( ) / 2  AND 
( ) ( ) / 2},  
ij n ij
i j
ij
i j
D x y x l l
z x s s i j
= ∈ ≤ +
≤ + ≠
R
 (3) 
where jl and js  are length and height of aircraft j. For 
simplicity we assume that all aircraft have the same size, by 
which (3) becomes: 
 
{ ; ( )   AND  ( ) },  ij n ij ijD x y x l z x s i j= ∈ ≤ ≤ ≠R  (4) 
 
Notice that in (4), ijD  depends of (i,j).  
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If tx  hits 
ijD  at time ijτ , then we say a collision event 
between aircraft (i,j) occurs at moment ijτ , i.e. 
 
inf{ 0;  },                   ij ijtt x D i jτ = > ∈ ≠  (5) 
Next we define the first moment iτ  of collision with any of 
the other aircraft, i.e. 
 
inf{ } inf{ 0; }
inf{ 0; }
i ij ij
tj i j i
i
t
t x D
t x D
τ τ
≠ ≠
= = > ∈
= > ∈
 (6) 
with i ij
j i
D D
≠
=∪ . At moment 
iτ  we can stop the simulation 
of the process{ , }i it tx θ .  
An unbiased estimation procedure of the probability 
( )im Tτ <P  of collision on [ ]0,T  would be to simulate 
many times aircraft i amidst other aircraft over a period of 
length T and count all cases in which the realization of the 
moment iτ  is smaller than T. An estimator for the collision 
risk of aircraft i per unit T  of time then is the fraction of 
simulations for which i Tτ < . 
 
B. Risk factorization using multiple conflict levels 
Prior to a collision of aircraft i with aircraft j a sequence of 
conflicts ranging from long term to short term always occurs. 
In order to incorporate this explicitly in the MC simulation, we 
formalize this sequence of conflict levels through the sequence 
of closed subsets of nR , 1 1
ij ij ij ij
m mD D D … D−= ⊂ ⊂ ⊂ , 
with for k = 1,…, m: 
 
{ ; ( ) ( )  AND
 ( ) ( ) ,  for some },  
ij n ij ij
k k
ij ij
k k
D x y x v x d
z x r x h i j
= ∈ + ∆ ≤
+ ∆ ≤ ∆ ∈[0,Τ ] ≠
R
 
(7) 
where kd , kh  and kT are the parameters of the conflict 
definition at level k, and with 
md l= , mh s=  and 0mT = , 
and with 1k kd d+ ≥ , 1k kh h+ ≥  and 1k kT T+ ≥ . If tx  hits 
ij
kD  at time 
ij
kτ , then we say the first level k conflict event 
between aircraft (i,j) occurs at moment ijkτ , i.e.  
inf{ 0;  }ij ijk t kt x Dτ = > ∈  (8) 
Similarly as we did for the collision level, for aircraft i we 
consider the first moment ikτ  that aircraft i reaches conflict 
level k with any of the other aircraft, i.e. 
 
inf{ } inf{ 0;  }
inf{ 0;  }
i ij ij
k k t kj i j i
i
t k
t x D
t x D
τ τ
≠ ≠
= = > ∈
= > ∈
 (9) 
with i ijk k
j i
D D
≠
∆
∪ . 
Following [35], we can write the probability of collision of 
aircraft i with any of the other aircraft as a product of 
conditional probabilities of reaching the next conflict level 
given the current conflict level has been reached: 
1
( )
m
i i
m k
k
Tτ γ
=
< = ∏P  (10) 
where 1( )i i ik k kT Tγ τ τ −
∆
< <P  
With this, the problem can be seen as one to estimate the 
conditional probabilities ikγ  in such a way that the product of 
these estimators is unbiased. Let ikγ  denote the value 
estimated for ikγ . Because of the multiplication of the various 
individual ikγ  estimated values, which depend on each other, 
in general such a product may be heavily biased. The key 
novelty of [32] was to show that such a product may be 
evaluated in an unbiased way when{ }tx  makes part of a larger 
stochastic process that satisfies the strong Markov property.  
Hence the resulting sequential MC simulation essentially 
consists of taking advantage of the nested sequence of closed 
subsets of nR : 1 1
i i i
m mD D D … D−= ⊂ ⊂ ⊂ , and then start 
simulation from outside 1
iD  to 1
iD  (this yields 1iγ ), and 
subsequently simulate from 1
iD  to 2
iD  (this yields 2iγ ), from 
2
iD  to 3
iD  (this yields 3
iγ ),  …, and finally from 1imD −  to 
i
mD (this yields imγ ). The estimated risk for aircraft i to collide 
with any of the other aircraft then is 
1
m i
kk
γ
=
∏ . 
IV. SIMULATED SCENARIOS AND COLLISION RISK ESTIMATES  
The sequential MC simulation approach outlined in section 
III is now applied to three hypothetical AMFF scenarios. The 
first scenario has eight aircraft that fly at the same flight level. 
Based on their flight plans, the eight aircraft are expect to fly 
through the same point in space at the same moment in time. 
The second scenario has one aircraft flying through an area of 
seven randomly distributed aircraft per container of 40 Nm x 
40 Nm x 3000 feet. The third scenario is the same as the 
second, except with a container that is twice as large in 
width/length. Prior to describing these scenarios and 
simulation results, we explain the parametrization of the IPS 
algorithm used.  
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A. Parameterization of the IPS simulations  
The main safety critical parameter settings of the AMFF 
enabling technical systems (GPS, ADS-B and ASAS) are 
given in the Table I.  
 
TABLE  I.  PARAMETER VALUES OF AMFF ENABLING TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 
Model Parameter  Probability 
Global GPS down 1.0 x 510−  
Global ADS-B down1 1.0 x 610−  
Aircraft ADS-B Receiver down 5.0 x 510−  
Aircraft ADS-B Transmitter down 5.0 x 510−  
Aircraft ASAS System mode corrupted 5.0 x 510−  
Aircraft ASAS System mode failure 5.0 x 510−  
 
The IPS conflict levels k are defined by parameter values 
for lateral conflict distance kd , conflict height kh  and time to 
conflict kT . These values have been determined through two 
steps. The first was to let an operational expert make a best 
guess of proper parameter values. Next, during initial 
simulations with the IPS some fine tuning of the number of 
levels and of parameter values per level has been done. The 
resulting values are given in Table II.  
 
TABLE II.   IPS CONFLICT LEVEL PARAMETER VALUES 
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
kd (Nm) 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 2.5 1.25 0.5 0.054 
kh (ft) 900 900 900 900 900 500 250 131 
kT (min) 8 2.5 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 
 
B. Eight aircraft on collision course 
In this simulation eight aircraft start at the same flight level, 
some 250 km out of each other, and fly in eight 45 degrees 
differing directions with a ground speed of 240 m/s, all up to 
the same point in the middle. By running ten times the IPS 
algorithm the collision risk is estimated ten times. The number 
of particles per IPS simulation run is 12,000. The total 
simulation time took about 20 hours on two machines, and the 
computer memory load was about 2.0 GigaByte per machine. 
 For the first four IPS runs, the estimated fractions ikγ  are 
given in Table III for each of the conflict levels, k = 1,..,8, and 
aircraft i = 1. It can be seen that the first IPS run has zero 
particles that reach the last (8th level). Hence the first IPS run 
does not yield a useful estimate, and is not used for estimating 
the risk.  
 
 
1
 Global ADS-B down refers to frequency congestion/overload of the data 
transfer technology used for ADS-B. 
 
TABLE III.   FRACTIONS COUNTED DURING FOUR  IPS RUNS OF SCENARIO 1 
Level 1st IPS 2nd IPS 3rd IPS 4th IPS 
1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
2 0.528 0.529 0.539 0.533 
3 0.426 0.429 0.424 0.431 
4 0.033 0.036 0.035 0.037 
5 0.175 0.180 0.183 0.181 
6 0.267 0.158 0.177 0.144 
7 0.150 0.268 0.281 0.427 
8 0.000 0.009 0.233 0.043 
Product of 
fractions 0.0  5.58x
7
10
−
 1.67x 510−  4.01x 610−  
 
The IPS estimated mean probability for one aircraft to 
collide with any of the other seven aircraft equals 2.2×10-5. 
The minimum and maximum values now are respectively a 
factor 250 lower and a factor 4 higher than the mean value. 
We also verified that this risk value was not sensitive at all to 
the failure rates of the ASAS related technical systems.  
In [4] a similar eight aircraft encounter scenario had been 
simulated many times, without experiencing any collision 
event. However, at a collision probability value of 2.2×10-5, 
one needs to run about 6,000 runs to have a 50% chance of 
counting at least one collision, and this high number of 
independent simulations with the eight aircraft encounter have 
not been performed. As such the current results agree quite 
well with the fact that in these earlier simulations for the eight 
aircraft scenario no collision has been observed. We also 
verified that the novel simulation results for the eight aircraft 
scenario agreed quite well with the expectation of the 
designers of the AMFF operational concept. 
 
C. Free flight through an artificially constructed airspace 
In this simulation the complete airspace is divided into 
packed containers. Within each container a fixed number of 
seven aircraft (i=2,.,8) fly at arbitrary position and in arbitrary 
direction at a ground speed of 240 m/s.  One additional aircraft 
(i=1) aims to fly straight through a sequence of connected 
containers, at the same speed, and the aim is to estimate its 
probability of collision with any of the other aircraft per unit 
time of flying.  
Per container, the aircraft within it behave the same. This 
means that we have to simulate each aircraft in one container 
only, as long as we apply the ASAS conflict prediction and 
resolution also to aircraft copies in the neighboring containers. 
In principle this can mean that an aircraft experiences a 
conflict with its own copy in a neighboring container. This 
also means that the size of a container should not go below a 
certain minimum size.  
By changing container size we can vary traffic density. To 
choose the appropriate traffic density, our reference point is 
the highest number (17) of aircraft counted at 23rd July 1999 in 
an en-route area near Frankfurt of size 1 degree x 1 degree x 
FL290-FL420. This comes down to 0.0032 a/c per Nm3. For 
our simulation we assume a 3 times higher traffic density, i.e. 
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0.01 a/c per Nm3. This resulted in choosing containers having 
a length of 40 Nm, a width of 40 Nm and a height of 3000 feet, 
and with 8 aircraft flying in such container.  
By running the IPS algorithm ten times (+ one extra IPS run 
later on) over 20 minutes, with 5 minutes convergence time 
prior to this, the collision probability per unit time of flying 
has been estimated. The number of particles per IPS 
simulation run is 10,000. The total simulation time took about 
300 hours on two machines, and the load of computer memory 
per machine was about 2.0 GigaByte. For the first four IPS 
runs, the estimated fractions ikγ  are given in Table IV for each 
of the conflict levels, k = 1,..,8, for aircraft i = 1. 
 
TABLE IV.  FRACTIONS COUNTED DURING FOUR IPS RUNS OF SCENARIO 2 
Level 1st IPS 2nd IPS 3rd IPS 4th IPS 
1 0.922 0.917 0.929 0.926 
2 0.567 0.551 0.560 0.559 
3 0.665 0.666 0.674 0.676 
4 0.319 0.331 0.323 0.321 
5 0.370 0.367 0.371 0.379 
6 0.181 0.158 0.162 0.171 
7 0.130 0.209 0.174 0.145 
8 0.067 0.005 0.094 0.066 
Product of 
fractions 6.42x
5
10
−
 6.76x 610−  1.11x 410−  6.99x 510−  
 
The estimated mean probability of collisions per 20 minutes 
aircraft flight equals 5.22×10-5, which is equal to a probability 
of collisions per aircraft flight hour of 1.6×10-4, with 
minimum and maximum values respectively a factor four 
lower and higher. We also verified that this risk value was not 
sensitive at all to the failure rates of the ASAS related 
technical systems.   
One should be aware that this value has been estimated for 
the simulation model of the intended AMFF operation. Hence 
the question is what this means for the intended AMFF 
operation itself? By definition a simulation model of AMFF 
differs from the intended AMFF operation. If it can be shown 
that the combined effect of these differences on the risk level 
is small, then the results obtained for the simulation model 
may be considered as a good representation of the accident 
risk of the intended operation. In order to assess the combined 
effect of these differences there is need to perform a bias and 
uncertainty assessment [30], [31].  
In order to better learn understanding what causes the 
collision risk of the simulation model to be relatively high, we 
performed an extra IPS run, and memorized in static memory 
for each particle the ancestor history at each of the eight levels. 
This allowed us to trace back what happened for the particles 
that hit the last level set (i.e. collision). There appeared to be 
five different collision events. Evaluation of these five 
collision events showed that all five happened under nominal 
safety critical conditions. Four of the five collisions were due 
to a growing number of multiple conflicts that could not be 
solved in time under the operational concept adopted. The fifth 
collision was of another type: at quite a late moment finally a 
conflict between two aircraft was solved with a maneuver by 
one of the two aircraft. However because of this maneuver 
there was a sudden collision with a third nearby aircraft. 
These detailed evaluations of the five collision events of the 
11th IPS run also showed that a significant increase of collision 
risk is caused by the relatively small height (4000 ft) of a 
container. Because of this small height it happened that an 
aircraft in one container came in conflict with a copy of its 
own in a neighbouring container, and in such a situation there 
was an undesired limitation in conflict resolution options, and 
thus an undesired artificial increase in collision risk.  
The results in this section seem to indicate that the key 
factor in the increased risk of collision for encounters with 
homogeneous traffic in the background - as opposed to the 
eight encountering aircraft scenario - are the multiple conflicts. 
Under the far higher traffic densities than what the AMFF 
operational concept was designed for, it is not always possible 
to timely solve a sufficiently high fraction of those multiple 
conflicts. On the basis of this finding one would expect that the 
collision risk would decrease faster than linear with a decrease 
in traffic density. The validity of this expectation is verified by 
the next scenario.  
D. Reduction of aircraft density by a factor four 
Now we enlarge the length and width of each container by a 
factor two. This means that the traffic density is gone down by 
a factor four. Hence the density is now ¾ of the density 
counted on 23rd July 1999 in the en-route area near Frankfurt. 
This still is a factor 2.5 higher than current average density 
above Europe. At the same time simulated flying time has been 
increased to 60 minutes (with 10 minutes prior flying to 
guarantee convergence). 
By running four times the IPS algorithm the collision risk is 
estimated four times. The number of particles per IPS 
simulation run is 10,000. The total simulation time took about 
280 hours on two machines, and the load of computer memory 
per machine was about 2.0 GigaByte. For these IPS runs, the 
estimated fractions ikγ  are given in Table V for each of the 
conflict levels, k = 1,..,8, for aircraft i = 1. 
 
TABLE V.  FRACTIONS COUNTED DURING FOUR IPS RUNS OF SCENARIO 3 
Level 1st IPS 2nd IPS 3rd IPS 4th IPS 
1 0.755 0.750 0.752 0.749 
2 0.295 0.292 0.286 0.285 
3 0.476 0.475 0.497 0.487 
4 0.263 0.258 0.266 0.267 
5 0.321 0.315 0.300 0.328 
6 0.068 0.088 0.082 0.096 
7 0.156 0.367 0.290 0.254 
8 0.011 0.059 0.021 0.005 
Product of 
fractions 1.07x
6
10
−
 1.61x 510−  4.31x 610−  1.07x 610−  
 
The estimated mean probability of collision per aircraft 
flight hour equals 5.64×10-6, with minimum and maximum 
values respectively a factor five lower and higher. This is 
about a factor 30 lower than the previous scenario with a four 
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times higher aircraft density. Thus, for the model there is a 
steep decrease of collision probability with decrease of traffic 
density, and this agrees well with the expectation at the end of 
the previous section.  
E. Discussion of IPS simulation results  
Because of the IPS simulation approach we were able to 
estimate collision risk for complex multiple aircraft scenarios. 
This is a major improvement over what was accomplished by 
[8] for a scenario of two free flight equipped aircraft that were 
supposed to fly within a fixed route structure. Inherent to the 
IPS way of simulation, the dynamic memory of the computers 
used appeared to pose the main limitation on the full 
exploitation of the novel sequential MC simulation approach. 
This also prevented performing a bias and uncertainty 
assessment for the differences between the simulation model 
and the AMFF operation. As long as such a bias and 
uncertainty assessment has not been performed, any 
conclusion drawn from the simulation apply to the simulation 
model only, and need not apply to the intended AMFF 
operation.  
The simulations performed for a model of AMFF allow free 
flight operational concept developers to learn characteristics of 
the simulation model. Because of the sequential MC 
simulation based speed up, these simulations can show events 
that have not been observed before in MC simulations of an 
AMFF model. Under far higher traffic densities than what the 
AMFF operational concept has been designed for, the 
simulations of the model shows it is not always possible to 
timely solve multiple conflicts. As a result of this, at high 
traffic levels there is a significant chance that multiple 
conflicts are clogging together, and this eventually may cause 
a non-negligible chance of collision between aircraft in the 
simulation model. It has also been shown that by lowering 
traffic density, the chance of collision for the model rapidly 
goes down. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper studied collision risk estimation of a free flight 
operation through a sequential Monte Carlo simulation. First a 
Monte Carlo simulation model of this free flight operational 
concept has been specified in a compositional way using the 
Stochastically and Dynamically Coloured Petri Net (SDCPN). 
Subsequently a novel sequential MC simulation method [32]- 
[34] has been extended for application to collision risk 
estimation in air traffic, and has subsequently been applied to 
an SDCPN model of free flight.  
The results obtained clearly show that the novel simulation 
model specification and collision risk estimation methods 
allow to speed up Monte Carlo simulation for a much more 
complex simulation model than what was possible before (e.g. 
[8], [36]). Moreover, for the simulation model of the free flight 
operational concept considered, behavior has be made visible 
that was expected by free flight concept designers, but could 
not be observed in earlier Monte Carlo simulations: the rare 
chance of clogging multiple conflicts at far higher traffic 
density levels than where the particular concept has been 
designed for. Hence, further attention has to be drawn towards 
the development and incorporation in the particular 
operational concept design of advanced methods in handling 
multiple conflicts. [4] studied a conflict resolution approach 
that performs better than the one adopted in the AMFF 
concept. In addition, there are some complementary 
developments that aim to develop complex conflict resolution 
solvers with guaranteed level of performance [37], [38], 
including ways to incorporate situation awareness views by 
human operators (pilots and/or controllers) in these 
combinatorial conflict resolution problems [39].  
The main value of having performed this collision risk 
estimation for an initial simulation model of AMFF is that this 
provides valuable feedback to the design team and allows them 
to learn from Monte Carlo simulation results they have never 
seen before. This allows them to significantly improve their 
understanding when and why multiple conflicts are not solved 
in time anymore in the simulation model. Subsequently the 
operational concept designers can use their better 
understanding for adapting the AMFF design such that it can 
better bring into account future high traffic levels.   
 In its current form the sequential MC simulation approach 
works well, but at the same time poses very high requirements 
on the availability of dynamic computer memory and 
simulation time. The good message is that in literature on 
sequential MC simulation (e.g. [40]-[43]), complementary 
directions have been developed which remain to be explored 
for application to free flight collision risk estimation. These 
potential improvements of sequential MC simulation approach, 
and their application to free flight collision risk and bias and 
uncertainty estimation, will be studied in follow-up research. 
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